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Appellant challenges the August 2021 determination of the Board, denying release and
imposing a 15-month hold. The instant offense involved Appellant luring a fifteen-year-old girl
and the seventeen-month-old infant she was babysitting to a secluded area, raping the girl, and
fatally stabbing her forty-four times. Appellant then killed the crying infant by slitting his throat
and stabbing him an additional six times. The Appeals Unit received a letter-brief from Appellant’s
counsel on September 9, 2021 purporting to perfect his appeal, even though Appellant had not yet
been provided with the transcript of the interview or other relevant records requested by
Appellant’s counsel. The transcript was sent to Appellant’s counsel on September 20, 2021 and
requested records were provided via e-mail on October 18, 2021. As no supplemental materials
amending Appellant’s submission have been received since the initial letter-brief, the Appeals Unit
now issues its findings and recommendation in the interest of responding within four months.
Appellant’s letter-brief raises the following issues in bullet point form:
1) the denial is arbitrary and capricious and based solely on the seriousness of the underlying
offense;
2) politics and self-interest motivated the decision;
3) the decision is conclusory, irrational and proper, and evades judicial review and appellate
reversal;
4) the decision improperly weighs the statutory factors.
5) the decision relies on non-statutory factors including but not limited to “community” and
“official” opposition;
6) the decision violates Appellant’s Eighth Amendment rights;
7) the decision violates Appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights;
8) the decision fails to explain its departure from the COMPAS;
9) the panel weighed
as an aggravating, rather than a mitigating circumstance; and
10) the decision relies upon factual errors.
These arguments are without merit. To the extent Appellant attempts to assert arguments relating
to prior Board appearances, those claims are moot and not a proper part of the instant challenge.
Those claims are also the subject of ongoing litigation.
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a
reasonable probability that, if such [incarcerated individual] is released, he will live and remain at
liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society
and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive
Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)
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requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific incarcerated individual,
including, but not limited to, the individual’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex
rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is
discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s
discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept.
2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The
Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros
v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007). In the absence
of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be
presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914,
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole,
157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the
appropriate factors, including: the instant offense of two counts of Juvenile Offender Murder in
the second degree; Appellant’s age at the time of the offense; the diminished culpability of youth;
Appellant’s middle-class upbringing and boyhood challenges
,
and struggling in school;
Appellant’s
friendships,
and his history of harming multiple animals as a teen; Appellant’s
efforts during incarceration to change and grow into a man from the
that committed
the crimes; Appellant’s institutional achievements including a positive disciplinary record,
educational achievements with Bard College, completion of all recommended programs including
sex offender training and extensive vocational training; and release plans to receive assistance and
housing from a reentry organization. The Board also had before it and considered, among other
things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, the sentencing minutes, official and community
opposition to Appellant’s release, letters that Appellant drafted and sent to the Apology Bank, and
Appellant’s multiple parole packets including achievements, a personal statement, detailed release
plans, certificates, and letters of support and reasonable assurance.
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After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release
would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its
conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the heinous and extremely violent instant offenses,
official and community opposition to Appellant’s release, and Appellant’s failure to express genuine
remorse or meaningful empathy during the interview, in his personal statement, and in his
perfunctory apology letters to each family. See Matter of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555,
82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Robinson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 162
A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53 N.Y.S.3d 404,
149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164
A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Jones v. New York State Bd. of
Parole, 175 A.D.3d 1652, 1652, 108 N.Y.S.3d 505, 506 (3d Dept. 2019); Matter of Applewhite v.
New York State Bd. of Parole, 167 A.D.3d 1380, 91 N.Y.S.3d 308, 311 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter
of Beodeker v. Stanford, 164 A.D.3d 1555, 82 N.Y.S.3d 669 (3d Dept. 2018). While the Board
does not agree that aggravating factors are always necessary to support reliance on an incarcerated
individual’s crime, Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, there are multiple
aggravating factors present here including: the fact that Appellant targeted the young female victim
because he knew she would come and meet him and because he simply wanted to hurt someone; that
Appellant prepared for the crime by going home and getting his fishing knife; and the fact that
Appellant simply left the scene of the crime and had the presence of mind to clean up, attend a soccer
game, and go to work the next day.
The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the incarcerated individual of the
reasons for the denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d
996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788
N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d
Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d
881 (1st Dept. 1983).
Appellant’s claim that politics and self-interest motivated the decision is purely speculative and
unsubstantiated. Matter of MacKenzie v. Evans, 95 A.D.3d 1613, 1614, 945 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (3d
Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 815, 955 N.Y.S.2d 553 (2012); Matter of Huber v. Travis, 264 A.D.2d,
695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 1999).
Appellant’s contention that the decision evades judicial review and appellate reversal is without
merit. The Board’s decision was made in accordance with the law and was not irrational “bordering
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on impropriety.” Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000) (quoting Matter
of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980)).
The Board committed no error in its consideration of official opposition to Appellant’s release.
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A)(vii) requires the Board to consider recommendations of the
sentencing court, the incarcerated individual’s attorney, and the “district attorney.” As such, the
Board was obligated to consider the official statements it received. As for community opposition,
the Board may receive and consider written communications from individuals, other than those
specifically identified in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A), opposing an incarcerated individual’s
release to parole supervision. Matter of Jones, 175 A.D.3d 1652, 1652, 108 N.Y.S.3d 505, 506 (3d
Dept. 2019); Matter of Applewhite, 167 A.D.3d 1380, 91 N.Y.S.3d 308, 311 (3d Dept. 2018)
(“Contrary to petitioner’s contention, we do not find that [the Board’s] consideration of certain
unspecified ‘consistent community opposition’ to his parole release was outside the scope of the
relevant statutory factors that may be taken into account in rendering a parole release
determination”), appeal dismissed, 32 N.Y.3d 1219 (2019); Matter of Clark v. New York Bd. of
Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531, 89 N.Y.S.3d 134 (1st Dept. 2018) (“the Board permissibly considered
letters in opposition to the parole application submitted by public officials and members of the
community”); Matter of Rivera v. Stanford, 53 N.Y.S.3d 404, 149 A.D.3d 1445 (3d Dept. 2017),
aff’g Matter of Rivera v. Evans, Index No. 0603-16, Decision & Order dated July 5, 2016 (Sup.
Ct. Sullivan Co.)(LaBuda A.J.S.C.) (recognizing “[c]onsideration of community or other
opposition was proper under the statute”); Matter of Grigger v. New York State Div. of Parole, 11
A.D.3d 850, 852–53, 783 N.Y.S.2d 689, 691 (3d Dept. 2004), lv. denied, 4 N.Y.3d 704, 792
N.Y.S.2d 1 (2005). The same has also long been recognized as true with respect to letters
supporting an incarcerated individual’s potential parole release. See, e.g., Matter of Hamilton v.
New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d at 1273, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (3d Dept. 2014); Matter
of Gaston v. Berbary, 16 A.D.3d 1158, 1159, 791 N.Y.S.2d 781, 782 (4th Dept. 2005); Matter of
Torres v. New York State Div. of Parole, 300 A.D.2d 128, 129, 750 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760 (1st Dept.
2002; cf. Cardenales v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 371, 371, 830 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (1st Dept. 2007).
Indeed, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(c)(2) refers to the security of letters either in support of or in
opposition to an incarcerated individual’s release.
As for the Eighth Amendment, the denial of parole under a statute invoking discretion in parole
determinations does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Carnes v. Engler, 76 Fed. Appx. 79 (6th Cir. 2003); Lustgarden v. Gunter, 966 F.2d
552, 555 (10th Cir.), cert den. 506 U.S. 1008, 113 S. Ct. 624 (1992), rehearing denied 507 U.S.
955, 113 S. Ct. 1374 (1993); Pacheco v. Pataki, No. 9:07–CV–0850, 2010 WL 3909354, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010). Appellant’s maximum sentence is life imprisonment. The Board acted
within its discretion to hold Appellant for another 15 months, after which he will have the
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opportunity to reappear before the Board. Even assuming arguendo that the Eighth Amendment
applies to parole consideration for minor offenders, Appellant offers only a generic claim and the
record reveals no such violation. As outlined above, the Board discussed the circumstances of
Appellant’s youth at length, along with his growth and maturity since.
There is no merit to Appellant’s contention that the panel weighed youth as an aggravating,
rather than a mitigating circumstance. The Board considered Appellant’s youth at the time of the
crimes, but ultimately “placed greater emphasis on other factors, including the seriousness of [his]
crimes and his history of unlawful and violent conduct, as it was entitled to do.” Matter of Allen
v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 78 N.Y.S.3d 445 (3d Dept.) (citing Matter of Hamilton v. New
York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 1274, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014)), lv. denied,
32 N.Y.3d 903 (2018); see also Matter of Campbell v. Stanford, 173 A.D.3d 1012, 105 N.Y.S.3d
461 (2d Dept. 2019). The Board acknowledged Appellant’s age and the diminished culpability of
youth but explained that, while
can be impulsive, Appellant’s actions were purposeful
and intentional.
There is no Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine facts in connection with
a parole release determination. Cf. Billiteri v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Parole Board is entitled to consider behavior described in pre-sentence investigation report); U.S.
v. Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 807-10 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding no right to jury trial in supervised release
proceedings).
The Board considered the COMPAS instrument and did not depart from it. That is, the decision
was not impacted by a departure from a scale. Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 2. For
example, the Board did not find a reasonable probability that Petitioner will not live and remain at
liberty without violating the law but rather concluded, despite low risk scores, release would be
inappropriate under the other two statutory standards. This is entirely consistent with the Board’s
intention in enacting the amended regulation.
Finally, while Appellant suggests that the decision relies upon factual errors, no alleged
mistakes are specified.
Recommendation:

Affirm.
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